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 MODERNIZATION OR A MISSED OPPORTUNITY? THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY UPDATES THE 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA” or the “Act”) was en-
acted in 1977 as a safeguard to ensure that insured depository institutions 
meet the credit needs of their entire community, including low- and mod-
erate-income neighborhoods.1  The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (“FRB”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
conduct periodic “performance evaluations” to determine whether these 
institutions distribute loans fairly and evenly among customers of all eco-
nomic backgrounds.2  
Banks and lawmakers alike have recently questioned whether the 
CRA adequately measures how banks extend credit and services to vari-
ous demographic groups.3  Of the nation’s 5,644 depository institutions 
subject to CRA examinations, 96% receive a passing rate, with only 16 
of North Carolina’s 949 respective branches and offices receiving a sub-
par rating.4  While at first glance these numbers suggest financial inclu-
sion by the overwhelming majority of banks, the current evaluation pro-
cess does not adequately measure banks’ performance in light of CRA 
objectives or technological and regulatory changes in the banking indus-
try.5 
 
 1. Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) § 30, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012) (charging the 
appropriate federal supervisory agencies to encourage financial institutions to “help meet the 
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institutions.”). 
 2. FED. FIN. INST. COUNSEL, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ACT: BACKGROUND & PURPOSE 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm. 
 3. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Modernization Recommendations (Apr. 3, 2018) (describing the 
Treasury’s call for modernization of CRA). 
 4. FED. FIN. INST. COUNSEL, FFIEC INTERAGENCY CRA RATING SEARCH (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.ffiec.gov/%5C/craratings/default.aspx; Memorandum from Treas. to the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 28 (Apr. 3, 2018). 
 5. See Scott Astrada, BankThink: Otting Should Strengthen, Not Weaken, CRA, AM. 
BANKER, June 29, 2018, 2:33 PM, https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/otting-should-
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  Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting has demonstrated his 
willingness to update CRA procedures in light of the Trump Administra-
tion’s pledge to increase efficiency and effectiveness of financial regula-
tion.6  On June 15, 2018, the OCC released a bulletin announcing modi-
fications to supervisory policy and processes for CRA performance 
evaluations, and on August 28, 2018, released an Advanced Notice for 
Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) seeking public comment on various 
improvements to the CRA.7  While the OCC was acting alone, its modi-
fications and proposals were made after the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury released a report in June, 2017, which “comprehensively as-
sesse[d] how the CRA could be improved,”8 and a thirty-five-page mem-
orandum on April 3, 2018, outlining weaknesses of the CRA and recom-
mendations for its improvement.9  While these updates are intended to 
provide more accurate and reliable indicators of a bank’s lending and in-
vestment activity across its community, the new protocol does not ad-
dress the technological changes impacting banking operations.10 
This Note addresses whether the OCC’s recent updates to the 
CRA policy and procedures effectively meet concerns that the Act is an-
tiquated.  Part II explains the history of the CRA, and the process by 
which banks are evaluated under the Act.11  Part III explains the various 
critiques of the CRA in its current state.12  Part IV assesses the recent 
changes to the CRA.13  Part V evaluates how the proposed changes to the 
CRA inadequately meet the needs of borrowers and banks.14 
 
strengthen-not-weaken-cra (discussing the history of lending discrimination that necessitates 
strong lending regulations via the CRA). 
 6. See Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 § 1(f) (Feb. 3, 2017) (outlining the 
“Core Principles” of the Trump Administration’s financial policy). 
 7. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework, 83 Fed. Reg. 
45053 (proposed Aug. 28, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25). 
 8. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES, BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS (2017). 
 9. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp. 9 (Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Memorandum from Treasury]. 
 10. See Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), AM. BANKERS ASS’N, 
https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Issues/Pages/modernizing-cra.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 
2019) (claiming that the rules implementing CRA “have not kept pace with the times or with 
new technologies”). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
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II. CRA EXAMINATION PROCESS AND HISTORY 
Congress passed the CRA to require the OCC, FRB and FDIC to 
use their authority when examining financial institutions to encourage in-
sured depository institutions to “help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with safe and sound 
operation.”15  These three agencies have since implemented various reg-
ulations guiding the processes for evaluation, both individually in specific 
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”), and jointly via a 
series of Inter-Agency Questions and Answers.16  Since Congress granted 
these agencies discretion in determining how to evaluate banks’ commu-
nity lending performance, it has repeatedly tightened the reins to require 
greater disclosure and a more objective system.17 
Examination results were initially not made available to the pub-
lic, but Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) to amend the CRA and require 
regulators to provide more detailed written evaluations, publicly disclose 
CRA results, and establish a tiered rating system.18  Further, the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 required 
separate CRA performance assessments in each state where a bank main-
tains a physical presence.19  The following year, in 1995, the CRA exam-
ination process was modified to account for an institution’s size and busi-
ness operations.20  Most recently, the agencies decided to adjust the asset 
size thresholds for small and large institutions depending on the Con-
sumer Price Index in 2005.21  But, while many have blamed CRA 
 
 15. Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) § 30(b), 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012). 
 16. See generally TREASURY, FED. RESERVE SYS. AND FDIC, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
ACT: INTERAGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT, 81 
Fed. Reg. 48506, 48506 (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter TREASURY INTERAGENCY 
QUESTIONNAIRE] (implementing the most recent form of the Inter-Agency Questions and An-
swers). 
 17. DARYLL GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43661 AT 8, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (2017). 
 18. 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2012). 
 19. Id. § 2906(d) (removing restrictions on inter-state branching). 
 20. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT (Feb. 13, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testi-
mony/braunstein20080213a.htm (stating that the CRA was modified in 1995 in response to 
directive from President Clinton, ordering the respective agencies to make CRA regulations 
more performance based, clarify performance standards, and make examination procedures 
more consistent); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156 (1995). 
 21. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u) (2012).  
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requirements for contributing to the 2008 financial crisis, few improve-
ments have been made in recent years to reflect the current state of bank-
ing.22 
The OCC regulates national banks and federal savings associa-
tions, the FRB regulates state-chartered banks who are members of the 
Federal Reserve System (“FRS”), and the FDIC regulates insured state 
banks that are not members of the FRS.23  Insured depository institutions 
are generally examined by their respective federal regulating agency 
every three years, or less frequently in the case of smaller banks.24  The 
results of these examinations are measured by CRA Performance Evalu-
ations, made public through the Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council (“FFIEC”), and are assigned a rating of Outstanding, Satis-
factory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance.25 
While performance evaluations depend on the size and type of 
bank evaluated, large banks with more than $1.252 billion in assets have 
the most comprehensive test, consisting of the Lending Test, Investment 
Test, and Service Test.26  All banks are subject to the Lending Test, which 
evaluates the number and dollar amount of home mortgage, small busi-
ness, small farm, and consumer loans among all income levels within the 
bank’s assessment area.27  The Investment Test assesses the investment’s 
dollar amount, complexity, and benefit to the assessment area, plus the 
degree to which these investments are not routinely provided by private 
investors.28  Finally, the Service Test examines the availability and effec-
tiveness of retail banking services, and how community development ser-
vices are provided within the assessment area.29  In addition, Intermediate 
Small Banks, Wholesale Banks, and Limited Purpose Banks are subject 
 
 22. But see Neil Bhutta & Daniel Ringo, Assessing the Community Reinvestment Act’s 
Role in the Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve Board (May 26, 2015), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/assessing-the-community-reinvestment-acts-
role-in-the-financial-crisis-20150526.html (arguing that the incentive structure of the CRA 
contributed little to the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis). 
 23. See OCC, CRA QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/cra/questions-and-answers.html (describ-
ing the regulatory landscape of CRA implementation).  
 24. See id. (stating that banks with $250 million or less aggregate assets and an “out-
standing” rating are examined no sooner than 60 months after the most recent examination, 
while banks of this size receiving a “satisfactory” rating are examined no sooner than 48 
months after the most recent examination). 
 25. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 28. 
 26. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 29. 
 27. 12 C.F.R. § 25.22 (2012). 
 28. Id. § 25.23. 
 29. Id. 
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to Community Development tests that evaluate the number and amount 
of community development loans, qualified investments, and community 
development services, plus the bank’s responsiveness to credit and com-
munity development needs within the assessment area.30 
CRA ratings are ultimately determined by adding the points re-
ceived on the Lending, Investment, and Services Tests.31  Regulators use 
these ratings when considering a bank’s application to expand deposit 
facilities by obtaining a national bank charter, opening new branches, re-
locating the home office or branch office, and merge or acquire other 
banks.32  However, while banks that receive below a “satisfactory” rating 
may be denied permission to expand their activities until improving their 
rating, there is no way to actually penalize banks for poor lending perfor-
mances in their community.33 
III. CALLS FOR MODERNIZATION 
A.         Changes in Technology and the Business of Banking 
Despite organizational and technological changes that have af-
fected the banking industry, the CRA has failed to evolve since its enact-
ment over forty years ago.34  First, the practice of measuring CRA activity 
within assessment areas bound by a bank’s physical geographic location 
is unrepresentative of a banks’ overall activity—and thus outdated.35  
Since the CRA’s birth, banking operations have expanded from tradi-
tional “brick and mortar” facilities—consisting of an institution’s main 
 
 30. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.24 (codifying procedure for the service test); see also Memoran-
dum from Treasury supra note 9, at 29 (designating Intermediate Small Banks as banks with 
between $313 million and $1.252 billion in assets). 
 31. See Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 30 (delegating the requisite point 
value for each rating). 
 32. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (2012). 
 33. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 31. 
 34. See Joseph Otting, BankThink: We Have a Once-in-a-Generation Chance to Revamp 
CRA. Let’s Use It., AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 2018 (claiming changes to the regulatory frame-
work “have failed to keep up with the evolution of how bank services are delivered, most 
significantly as a result of interstate branching and the digitization of service”); but see Riegle-
Neal Act Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal Act”), 12 
U.S.C. § 2906(d) (2012) (delineating CRA evaluation standards for institutions with interstate 
branches). 
 35. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, CONSUMER AFFAIRS: DELINEATION OF 
ASSESSMENT AREAS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.kansascityfed.org/en/banking/fedconnec-
tions/archive/delineation-of-assessment-areas-8-1-17 (describing the process by which as-
sessment areas are formed). 
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office, its branches, and deposit-taking ATMs—to a digital empire of 
online lending and mobile banking apps.36  Customers’ physical presence 
is no longer required to deposit funds or take out loans.37  Rather, a cus-
tomer may maintain an account with a bank in California, withdraw cash, 
deposit checks, and take out loans with the touch of a screen—without 
even leaving the customer’s home in New York.38  Today’s CRA exam-
ination process fails to account for the fact that banks no longer lend to 
customers strictly within their physical communities.39  Instead, the eval-
uation should consider a bank’s lending activity overall, beyond geo-
graphic confines.40 
Banks are currently required to present one or more assessment 
areas for review, which include the institution’s main office, branches, 
ATMs, and surrounding geographies in which the institution has origi-
nated or purchased a substantial portion of its loans.41  However, the as-
sessment area may not extend substantially beyond a metropolitan statis-
tical area or state boundary.42  Because banks’ lending activity is no 
longer confined within a state or geographic region, this method of eval-
uation substantially limits banks’ comprehensive performance from CRA 
consideration.43  In fact, examiners have increasingly begun to disregard 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., SANTANDER BANK, Bank Digitally and Confidentially, https://www.santan-
derbank.com/us/personal/banking/digital-banking/digital-banking-overview (last visited Feb. 
9, 2019) (advertising the ability to “Check your balance, deposit checks, pay bills, shop with 
Apple Pay, or transfer money virtually anywhere, any time”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Kenneth Thomas, Why Fintechs Should be Held to CRA Standards, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 24, 2018. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Tina M. Brinson, Your Assessment Area and Performance Context, FIN. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. at 3, (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/other_events/2016-10-
27-banker-call.pdf (defining an assessment area as consisting of one or more MSAs (Metro-
politan Statistical Areas), or one or more contiguous political subdivisions such as counties, 
cities, or towns, including geographies where an institution has its deposit taking facilities, 
and surrounding areas where a substantial portion of loans are made. The assessment area 
may not extend substantially beyond an MSA or state boundary, and may not reflect illegal 
discrimination or arbitrarily exclude low- and moderate-income areas). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Lael Brainard, Keeping Community at the Heart of the Community Reinvestment 
Act, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM (May 18, 2018), https://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20180518a.htm (discussing the need for CRA as-
sessments to adapt to how technological advances have changed branching operations). 
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a bank’s assessment area, and are instead asserting that examiners should 
define the area that banks serve during the evaluation process.44 
If assessment areas based on counties, metropolitan statistical ar-
eas, or other measures of a bank’s physical location present challenges to 
the precision of CRA evaluations, the concept of assessment areas may 
be unworkable for contemporary banks with non-traditional business 
models.45  “Specialized banks”—wholesale, limited purpose, or internet 
banks—tend to have an even more limited presence in their designated 
assessment areas.46  While many of these institutions are well-known 
across the nation, they also tend to carry a smaller asset base and thus 
lack the ability and physical presence to invest in community lending in 
one specific area.47  
The American Bankers Association (“ABA”) argues that banks, 
rather than examiners, should define the assessment areas “based upon 
the market they can reasonably serve.”48  Meanwhile, the Treasury advo-
cates for a framework that includes areas where the bank is physically 
located, as well as low- and moderate-income communities “outside of 
where the bank has its physical footprint, and in areas where the bank 
accepts deposits and does substantial business.”49  By using a broader 
sample for assessment based upon the realistic expectations of where the 
bank’s customers live, the CRA would allow banks to address the needs 
among the entire customer-base, not just those who live within the as-
sessment area.50 
Second, as consumers are faced with more options for loans as a 
result of improved banking technology, the CRA does not adequately ac-
count for alternative delivery systems.51  While the Interagency 
 
 44. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CRA MODERNIZATION: MEETING COMMUNITY NEEDS AND 
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY 5 (2017), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Documents/CRA-
WhitePaper2017.pdf [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER]. 
 45. But see Brainard, supra note 43 (arguing that traditional branching operations are still 
crucial in rural communities). 
 46. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7. 
 47. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7. 
 48. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 5 (claiming that a “bank’s size, strategy, and 
business model are relevant considerations as a bank determines the appropriate geography 
of its CRA program”). 
 49. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 6. 
 50. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7. 
 51. Michelle Lazette, As Branches Decline, How Do Bankers Continue to Comply with 
CRA?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cleveland-
fed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/forefront/ff-v7n04/ff-20161109-v7n0401-as-
branches-decline-how-do-bankers-continue-to-comply-with-cra.aspx (describing the 
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Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment directs ex-
aminers to consider alternative systems for delivering retail products and 
services to the extent that they are effective in meeting the needs of low- 
and moderate-income individuals, banks receive inconsistent credit for 
these services.52  Regulators evaluate this activity under the Service Test, 
which determines the “innovativeness or complexity of qualified invest-
ments,” but the number of points these investments receive relative to 
others “is up to the regulator’s judgment given that no formal definition 
of ‘innovativeness’ or ‘complexity’ has been established.”53  This test, 
which accounts for shifts in how banks provide financial services, “gets 
a fraction of the space devoted to the Lending Test” and “appears to have 
little impact on the provision of financial services to lower income indi-
viduals.”54 
On July 31, 2018, the OCC announced it would begin to accept 
national bank charter applications from fintech companies.55  These com-
panies target millennials by boasting convenience and aim to lower the 
cost of banking through their mobile-only platform.56  While the OCC 
has demonstrated the agency’s willingness to consider non-traditional 
banking models for regulation, rather than a fintech charter, some experts 
fear that fintechs will not be held to the same community-lending stand-
ards as traditional banks due to their lack of physical offices.57  Varo 
Money, for example—a Salt Lake City fintech company without physical 
branches—has received preliminary and conditional approval from the 
OCC to receive a national bank charter and will use the Salt Lake City 
combined statistical area for CRA compliance—despite operating 
 
difficulties bankers face in predicting “how examiners will weigh branches and alternative 
delivery systems”). 
 52. TREASURY INTERAGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 16, at 48506. 
 53. GETTER, supra note 17, at 8.  
 54. William Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community Re-
investment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, FRBNY 
ECONOMIC POLICY REV., 169, 185 (June 2003), https://www.newyorkfed.org/mediali-
brary/media/research/epr/03v09n2/0306apga.pdf. 
 55. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting 
National Bank Charter Applications for Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html. 
 56. See generally Lisa Prevost, Mortgages for Millennials, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/realestate/mortgages-for-millennials.html (describing 
the simplicity and prevalence of online mortgage applications). 
 57. See Hilary Burns, Fintech Out to Start National Bank Clears One Hurdle but Faces 
More, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 2018 (noting that credit unions are currently exempt from CRA 
regulation). 
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exclusively electronically.58  It is clear that the regulators need to develop 
some set of uniform standards for evaluating these companies in order to 
avoid leniency by examiners and promote fair lending policies among 
this emerging form of banking. 
Low- and moderate-income individuals frequently use the cash-
checking businesses of branch banks, but receive subprime loans from 
less scrupulous digital sources which use automated systems to approve 
lending services.59  Nonetheless, the Service Test component of the CRA, 
which compares the hours of operation and equality of access to branches 
to low versus higher-income individuals, does not adequately measure 
the automated systems for approving loans.60  Consequently, lower-in-
come individuals remain “underserved . . . to a greater degree than they 
are with respect to mortgage lending.”61  Rather than focusing on how 
banks’ alternative delivery systems are tailored to low- and moderate-
income customers, critics claim the examination should consider whether 
these customers utilize these delivery channels.62  This could, in turn, en-
courage the aforementioned consumers to borrow from more reliable fi-
nancial institutions accompanied with less risk.63 
B.         Clarify Subjective Procedures and Reduce Discretion of 
Examiners 
While the inter-agency approach of CRA examinations allows for 
a more nuanced evaluation process and cumulative regulation, it is not 
free of bureaucratic hurdles.64  The CRA is often criticized for its incon-
sistent methodologies and measures of evaluation which can limit the 
 
 58. See Memorandum from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Mitchell S. 
Eitel, Re: Preliminary Conditional Approval of the De Novo Charter Application for the Pro-
posed Varo Bank, National Association, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2018) (“[t]he bank does not plan to 
have any branches or deposit taking ATMs. The only location around which the bank could 
delineate an [assessment area] under the regulations is its proposed main office, which will 
be located in Sale Lake City, Utah.”). 
 59. William Apgar, Jr. & Christopher Herbert, Subprime Lending and Alternative Finan-
cial Service Providers: A Literature Review and Empirical Analysis, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
AND URBAN DEV., at vii, https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/pdf/sublending.pdf. 
 60. 12 U.S.C. § 25.23 (2012). 
 61. Apgar & Duda, supra note 54, at 185. 
 62. ABA WHITE PAPER supra note 44, at 6. 
 63. ABA WHITE PAPER supra note 44, at 6. 
 64. See Hannah Lang, Fed’s Powell ‘Hopeful’ that Agencies will Come Together on CRA 
Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2018 (describing the challenges of coordinating CRA reform 
across multiple agencies).  
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ability to compare the performance of different banks.65  CRA examina-
tions consist of a two-part test composed of a Small Bank Lending Eval-
uation, and Community Development Test, which measures a bank’s 
loans, investments, and services separately.66  The Lending, Investments, 
and Services Tests are applied inconsistently by the different banking 
agencies.67 
The Lending Test is also applied inconsistently, as the OCC 
measures market share while other agencies measure portfolio shares.68  
These are both adequate indicators of performance individually, but are 
incompatible when compared against each other.69  Similarly, the 
measures used in the Investment Test—which evaluates CRA-related in-
vestments relative to a bank’s capacity—depend on which agency per-
forms the evaluation.70  While most agencies compare a bank’s invest-
ments to its assets, the OCC uses a ratio of investments to tier-one capital, 
complicating the way banks of similar sizes can be compared.71  Finally, 
in conducting the Service Test, the agencies differ in how much they con-
sider branches not within the low- and moderate-income tracts “that are 
in close proximity to [low- and moderate-income] tracts, and disagree 
about “what close proximity means.”72 
Some evaluation standards even differ within the same agency 
that conducts the performance evaluation.73 For example, in its 2013 ex-
amination of Capital One74 and 2007 examination of JP Morgan Chase,75 
 
 65. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 1 (arguing that the CRA examination pro-
cess needs more predictability and transparency); Getter, supra note 17, at 8; National Com-
munity Reinvestment Coalition, Letter to the Treasury: Strengthening the Community Rein-
vestment Act, NCRC (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ncrc.org/letter-to-treasury/ [hereinafter NCRC 
Letter to Treasury]. 
 66. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
(CRA), at 11, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/presentations/cra.pdf. 
 67. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65. 
 68. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (stating that the market share compares 
the percent of total low- and moderate-income market captured by the bank with the percent 
of overall market captured by the bank). 
 69. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65. 
 70. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65. 
 71. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65. 
 72. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65. 
 73. Getter, supra note 17, at 8. 
 74. Public Disclosure: Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act Per-
formance Evaluation, Capital One, National Association (Dec. 31, 2013), 
https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/oct16/13688.pdf. 
 75. Public Disclosure: Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act Per-
formance Evaluation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (January 1, 2007), 
https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/Aug08/8.pdf. 
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the OCC counted branches in outside the low- and moderate-income 
tracts “as if they are within one half mile of an LMI tract” in its examina-
tion of JP Morgan Chase, but the OCC used a measurement of one mile 
in its examination of Capital One.76  It is clear, therefore, that the Inter-
agency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment 
should be revised to include more specific procedures for which meas-
urements should be used during the performance evaluation.77 
Ultimately, the lack of clear guidelines for examination criteria 
gives individual examiners too much discretion during performance eval-
uations.78  The Treasury admitted in a memorandum published on April 
3, 2018, that the CRA has “too many subjective elements,” which “cre-
ates significant compliance burdens and related costs, without any com-
mensurate gain in quality or execution of banks’ CRA activity in the com-
munities that banks are aiming to serve.”79  In particular, individual 
examiners have the ability to determine either or a narrow or broad scope 
of the examination, choose the number of points each bank receives for 
its respective CRA eligible activities, and interpret the percentage of 
bank’s lending activity that falls within its assessment areas—or In/Out 
Ratio.80  In addition, there is no specific number of points required for a 
bank to earn each level of examiner rating.81 Current procedures “allow 
examiners to subjectively interpret and apply CRA examination policies 
and procedures.”82  Consequently, the Treasury—and interested parties 
across the ideological spectrum—advocate for a more clear-cut examina-
tion approach that would allow the results of similarly positioned banks 
to be more easily measured and compared.83 
C.         Other Criticisms of the CRA 
While critics have called for more clear and definite guidelines, 
the CRA also lacks inclusivity of certain characteristics that cannot be 
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measured by rigid standards.84  Many have suggested enhanced training 
of examiners as a solution that would allow those conducting the evalua-
tions to have a better understanding of why these tests are being con-
ducted, and which factors matter the most.85  In addition, the ambiguity 
of these guidelines and the debate about how certain activities should be 
included in CRA evaluations demonstrate the need for greater communi-
cation between regulators and banks.86 
Critics have disputed whether the evaluation process should al-
low banks to receive CRA credit for more types of loans, investments, 
and services than those previously recognized.87  The ABA argues that 
community development initiatives that would benefit a bank’s entire 
community do not receive community development credits because cur-
rent regulatory practices only recognize initiatives targeted to low- or 
moderate-income individuals, or which will “revitalize or stabilize disas-
ter areas or underserved or distressed middle-income areas.”88  Mean-
while, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) re-
torts that providing credit for financial education that broadly serves an 
entire community could allow banks to reduce their efforts targeting the 
low- and moderate-income communities specifically.89 
In addition, the NCRC and ABA disagree about whether small 
business lending should be considered for community development 
credit.90  The ABA claims that small business loans and loans to non-
profits with a community development purpose should be classified as 
community development loans in order to adequately measure the impact 
banks are having in their communities.91  Meanwhile, the NCRC claims 
that “doing so would double count small business loans and inflate the 
Lending Test rate.”92  Nonetheless, this dispute demonstrates the lack of 
transparency in the CRA evaluation process.93  Because the CRA “looks 
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backward,” providing feedback potentially years after the evaluation pro-
cess on whether investments are sufficient for CRA purposes, there is an 
established need for increased communication with CRA regulators, and 
a clear framework on which investments should receive credit.94 
IV. OCC MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
Recognizing the imperfections of the CRA in its current form, 
affiliated agencies have begun clearing the way to modernize the evalua-
tion process.95  Despite the Treasury memorandum suggesting improve-
ments to the CRA, the OCC has largely acted alone to revamp the CRA.96  
It requested public comment in its ANPRM, and released a bulletin to 
“inform national banks, federal savings associations, and federal 
branches and agencies (collectively banks) about clarifications to OCC 
supervisory policies and processes regarding how examiners evaluate and 
communicate bank performance under the CRA.”97  These proposals and 
modifications involve geographic constraints on assessment areas, the 
type of information considered in a performance evaluation, and changes 
to the timeline of the evaluation process.98 
A.         Geographic Factors 
One of the main sources of contention for the CRA is that, as 
banks evolve to use technology for desired services, the current protocol 
fails to account for the increasing spread of customers outside the geo-
graphic boundaries imposed by the assessment areas.99  The OCC bulletin 
states that, “in evaluating the borrower distribution of loans outside a 
bank’s [assessment areas, the OCC] evaluates lending state by state and 
compares the level of bank lending to statewide demographic 
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comparators.”100  While lending to small businesses and farms will not 
compensate for a poor lending performance within the assessment area, 
examiners may consider the distribution of these loans outside the assess-
ment area.101  This certainly demonstrates a trend toward expanding the 
evaluation of a bank’s lending beyond the designated assessment area to 
include areas outside the branch with high lending volumes.102  
This expansive approach to examining retail lending outside the 
bank’s assessment areas could resolve some of the issues that have 
emerged while assessing online banking and mobile lending platforms.103  
By considering a bank’s performance outside of its assessment areas, this 
system incentivizes banks to continue lending to low- and moderate-in-
come customers who do not live near a physical branch.104  This could, 
for example, benefit customers in rural areas who have few options in 
terms of physical storefronts.105  Rural banks will now face competitive 
pressure from their online counterparts who offer lower rates to a broader 
clientele.106 
The ANPRM additionally provides some avenue of guidance to 
regulate exclusively-online lenders.107  As fintechs like Varo begin to re-
ceive national bank charters, the provision comparing the level a bank 
lends within particular states to its demographic comparators may be eas-
ily applied to banks with no physical branches.108  Nonetheless, the OCC 
avoids burdening banks and their examiners by requiring them to analyze 
each and every state where the bank exists or purchases loans, but instead 
focuses on states “where the level of banking is sufficient to conduct a 
meaningful analysis of borrower distribution.”109 
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B.         Type of Information Considered in the Performance Evaluation 
Another source of criticism lies in the highly subjective guide-
lines for examiners to conduct performance evaluations.110  First, it is of-
ten still unclear whether an activity is considered to promote economic 
development under the existing CRA standards.111  In order to support 
community development, activities that promote economic development 
by financing small businesses and farms must meet both a “size” and a 
“purpose” test.112  The recent OCC bulletin describes the size test as 
measuring “size eligibility requirements” while the purpose test ensures 
that activities have a community development goal.113  This bulletin clar-
ifies some of the inconsistencies associated with the definition of com-
munity development, listing “loans, investments, and services that help 
to create, retain, and/or improve jobs for [low- and moderate-income] in-
dividuals, in [low- and moderate-income] geographies, or in areas tar-
geted for redevelopment” by any level of government as meeting the pur-
pose test.114  The notice further specifies that loans, investments, and 
services that help to retain jobs only count for CRA purposes when the 
loans demonstrate a community development purpose specifically enu-
merated by the agencies. 115 
This update removes some of the existing vagueness behind the 
community development qualifications, but does not resolve the debate 
over whether small business lending should qualify as community devel-
opment.116  While the updates to CRA policy provide additional guidance 
to examiners, and eliminate subjectivity with regards to the “size” and 
“purpose” tests required for economic development to be considered to 
support community development, the OCC essentially sidestepped the 
real issue at hand—leaving banks uncertain about which activities com-
ply with regulation, and ultimately necessitating further clarification.117 
In addition, the OCC seeks to increase the scrutiny non-metropol-
itan assessment areas receive by modifying the standards for scope of 
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examinations and effectively expand the amount of data considered over-
all.118  Currently, the Treasury reports that CRA examiners have the dis-
cretion to designate assessment areas as either full scope or limited 
scope.119  While full scope examinations consider both qualitative and 
quantitative factors, CRA examinations of limited scope assessment areas 
consider only quantitative factors, and include short narratives reporting 
whether the performance was consistent or inconsistent with the bank’s 
overall performance—measured by full-scope reviews.120 
 The majority of assessment areas subject to full-scope reviews 
are metropolitan statistical areas, whereas the majority of banks’ non-
metropolitan assessment areas receive limited-scope evaluations and gen-
erally report few community development activities in their performance 
evaluations.121  Because banks in non-metropolitan areas face less com-
petition, low- and moderate-income customers in these regions have 
fewer options for borrowing—making the CRA even more important in 
these areas.122  It therefore seems counterintuitive that these assessment 
areas would receive less scrutiny.123 
Because full-scope evaluations are more time-intensive and bur-
densome, examiners might have an incentive to examine banks under a 
limited scope when possible.124  The OCC’s 2018 bulletin seeks to reduce 
the discretion given to examiners in deciding whether to evaluate under 
a full or limited scope.125  First, the bulletin requires at least one assess-
ment area to be evaluated with full scope procedures when a bank has 
multiple assessment areas within a single state.126  This sets a baseline 
requiring a detailed examination of each state assessed.127  In addition, 
narrative comments and conclusions for non-metropolitan statistical ar-
eas within a state will be presented in a combined narrative in the 
 
 118. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97. 
 119. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 18. 
 120. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9. 
 121. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9. 
 122. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (“More full scope designation to rural 
areas, in particular, will result in banks making more retail loans, community development 
loans, and qualified investments in rural areas”). 
 123. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (“Applying more full scope designation 
to rural areas, in particular, will result in banks making more retail loans, community devel-
opemt loans, and qualified investments in rural areas.”). 
 124. See OCC Bulletin, supra note 97 (describing the processes for conducting full- and 
limited-scope evaluations). 
 125. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97. 
 126. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97. 
 127. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97. 
2019] CRA MODERNIZATION 501 
performance evaluation—as will metropolitan divisions within the same 
metropolitan statistical areas—and reviewed as a whole using either full- 
or limited-scope procedures as applicable.128  Consequently, more assess-
ment areas—both metropolitan and non-metropolitan—will be reviewed 
in greater detail more frequently.129 
Moreover, the June 2018 OCC bulletin provides guidance to ex-
aminers for determining the scope for evaluating the assessment area.130  
This “comprehensive approach” considers such factors as the lending, in-
vestment, and service needs in the assessment area, the number of banks 
in each assessment area (especially when few financial service providers 
operate in the assessment area), the importance of the examined bank to 
serving each assessment area, the length of time since the assessment area 
has been reviewed under full scope procedures, and public comments 
about the bank’s performance in the assessment area.131  Finally, the bul-
letin requires a bank’s performance in both full and limited scope assess-
ment areas to be considered for the area conclusion—increasing the im-
portance of limited scope evaluations.132  These changes will encourage 
examiners to scrutinize banks’ activity in small metropolitan and rural 
communities, rather than focusing merely on communities with more op-
tions when it comes to lending.133 
By setting clear standards for which assessment areas should re-
ceive full scope evaluation, and increasing the possibility that each as-
sessment area will be subject to a full scope evaluation at some point in 
time, these changes will efficiently expand the amount of data reviewed 
under the CRA.134  The rotating system will ensure that areas will be sub-
ject to greater scrutiny over time, but examiners will still be spared the 
intensity of requiring every assessment area to be evaluated under a full 
scope.135  The increase in data for consideration will allow examinations 
to be more flexible, whereas the guidance on which areas should receive 
heightened scrutiny will eliminate inconsistencies across examiners.136  
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While the OCC still has room to clarify the definition of community de-
velopment, the bulletin demonstrates a trend toward striking balance be-
tween objectivity and flexibility.137 
C.        Changes to the Evaluation Process 
Proposed changes to the timing of performance evaluations and 
the application of investigation results involving potential discriminatory 
or other illegal credit practices have received the bulk of attention coming 
from critics of the OCC’s June 2018 bulletin.138  Just nine days after the 
bulletin’s release, the nine members of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs voiced their concerns with these provi-
sions, asking that the Comptroller of the Currency question these imple-
mentations, and requesting that he rescind the bulletin.139  These 
provisions are also the subject of criticism from the NCRC.140 
First, the bulletin extended the CRA examination cycle for some 
banks.141 The examination cycle for banks with more than $250 million 
in assets and thirty or more rating areas on the previous CRA evaluation 
will be extended from thirty-six months to forty-eight; meanwhile, banks 
with less than thirty rating areas on the previous CRA evaluation remain 
subject to a thirty-six-month cycle.142  NCRC claims that a four-year cy-
cle can allow banks to demonstrate lax CRA efforts during the first two 
years of an exam cycle while increasing their efforts the last two years.143 
The Senate Committee on Banking corroborates these claims, ar-
guing that while performance evaluations “often take too long and can 
leave banks with dated ratings and the public with inadequate information 
about a bank’s current performance,” a more sensible policy change 
would have “maintained or shortened the 36-month exam cycle rather 
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than lengthening it to 48 months.”144  Modernization efforts should seek 
to streamline the evaluation process, enhance predictability, promote 
consistency, and ultimately encourage investing in low- and moderate-
income communities.145  By extending the time between evaluations, the 
OCC is instead allowing banks to act more unpredictably and inconsist-
ently, compensating for poor performance toward the end of their evalu-
ation cycles.146 
 Second, the proposed rules will allow performance evaluations 
to be published if investigations involving potentially discriminatory or 
otherwise illegal credit practices are not resolved within ninety days after 
a performance evaluation is considered final for issuance to the bank, ra-
ther than holding the exams open until the conclusion of these investiga-
tions, as was previously done.147  Any findings of discriminatory or ille-
gal credit practices after the issuance of a performance evaluation will be 
considered in the following CRA evaluation and penalized retroac-
tively.148  This change has been criticized by progressive interest groups 
and democratic politicians for allowing examiners to give banks more 
leeway, considering a bank’s corrective measures over their illegal prac-
tices in the subsequent CRA rating.149  Coupled with the extension in 
evaluation cycles, this provision is especially dangerous because exam-
iners have even more time to discount a bank’s discrimination since its 
discovery.150 
Much of the CRA’s influence on community lending practices 
comes from the deterrent threat imposed by ramifications for non-com-
pliance, as banks receiving less than a satisfactory rating on CRA exam-
inations may be blocked from branching, merging, or converting char-
ters.151  However, this provision would allow banks to make these critical 
business moves even after findings of deficiencies.152  In order to most 
effectively deter banks from engaging in illegal and discriminatory credit 
practices, and to prevent examiners from having too much influence on 
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the results of performance evaluations, the CRA ratings should be down-
graded as closely as possible to the illegal behavior so these ramifications 
are felt strongly in conjunction with the violation.153 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the OCC’s updates to the antiquated CRA provide worka-
ble standards that reduce discretion given to individual examiners, they 
fail to fully improve the predictability of the rating process and enhance 
banks’ certainty of their performance before the examination.154  While 
the last two components of the June bulletin—extending the evaluation 
period for large banks to forty-eight months, and applying results of in-
vestigations retroactively—are perhaps meant to ease the burden placed 
on banks during the examination process, the ends may be reached by 
much less contentious means.155  
CRA regulators have long faced pressure to increase the commu-
nication between banks and agencies before the evaluation process so that 
banks know whether they are complying before receiving their results.156  
While the bulletin mentions increasing the communication between ex-
aminers and OCC supervised banks during the performance evaluations, 
it does not address communication with banks before these evaluations 
begin.157  Furthermore, the bulletin makes no mention of coordinating the 
measures of assessment and comparison across agencies—or even indi-
vidual examiners—during the evaluation processes mentioned above.158  
It seems counterintuitive that the OCC would make efforts to modernize 
the CRA on its own, given that a great source of criticism lies in the un-
predictability of the CRA’s multi-agency structure.159  With more cer-
tainty of the status of their compliance, banks would be able to maximize 
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their service to the community while promoting cooperation and effi-
ciency for these regulatory bodies during the examination process.160 
The OCC does provide parameters that eliminate subjectivity for 
some of the evaluation’s qualitative measures.161  The requirements for 
which assessment areas should receive full versus limited scope evalua-
tions help to ensure CRA compliance by banks in less heavily populated 
areas.162  Plus, the description of activities that promote economic devel-
opment lists some factors for meeting the purpose test in order to shed 
light on which activities count toward “community development.”163  
However, the bulletin fails to eliminate the most glaring uncertainty sur-
rounding the definition of community development by staying silent as 
to whether small business lending counts as community development.164  
This move leaves the area subject to more debate in the future—and open 
to the discretion of the examiner.165 
Despite these shortcomings, the OCC’s modernization efforts do 
fall in line with objectives for adapting to changes in technology and the 
business of banking.166  The bulletin has enumerated protocols for as-
sessing how banks are lending outside their assessment area by compar-
ing the distribution lent outside assessment areas state-by-state to 
statewide demographic competitors.167  This provides guidance for 
fintech companies with few (if any) physical branches, and banks with 
customers operating via mobile applications outside the assessment 
area.168  Lending to those who do not live near a physical branch can 
bridge the divide between urban and rural users—with the latter often 
facing more difficulty obtaining loans.169 
The OCC’s efforts to modernize the CRA certainly improve spe-
cific areas of the evaluation process, but as a whole, the larger issues with 
the inter-agency construction remain unsolved.170  As these proposals 
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make their way through the OCC, the FDIC, FRB and OCC may miss a 
crucial opportunity to improve the regulatory process that controls the 
fate of community lending across demographics.171 
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